Advantage through training? A microeconometric evaluation of the employment effects of active labour market programmes in Poland by Puhani, Patrick A.
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Puhani, Patrick A.
Working Paper
Advantage through training? A microeconometric
evaluation of the employment effects of active labour
market programmes in Poland
ZEW Discussion Papers, No. 98-25
Provided in cooperation with:
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Suggested citation: Puhani, Patrick A. (1998) : Advantage through training? A microeconometric
evaluation of the employment effects of active labour market programmes in Poland, ZEW
Discussion Papers, No. 98-25, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24274Discussion Paper No. 98-25
Advantage through Training?
A Microeconometric Evaluation of the Employment
Effects of Active Labour Market Programmes in Poland
Patrick A. PuhaniAdvantage through Training?
A Microeconometric Evaluation of the Employment Effects of
Active Labour Market Programmes in Poland
Patrick A. Puhani
*




P.O. Box 10 34 43
D–68034 Mannheim
Germany
Tel.: +49 621 1235-281
Fax: +49 621 1235-225
e–mail: puhani@zew.de
JEL classification: J64, J68
Keywords: evaluation, microeconometrics, active labour market policy, Poland
*The author is also a Research Affiliate at the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), BonnNon-Technical Summary
Active labour market policies are supposed to raise the re-employment chances of (long-term)
unemployed people. To achieve this aim, Poland like other countries has adopted different types of
programmes.  Training courses either re-qualify their participants or upgrade skills in an old
occupation. Typical courses are computing, accounting, foreign languages, but also crafts like
tailoring or welding. Normally, these courses take place off the job. A conceptually rather different
type of active labour market policies are job subsidies, called intervention works in Poland. Here
the idea is to establish a contact between the unemployed person and an employer in order to
remove potential prejudices that employers might have against the (long-term) unemployed. In the
Polish case, the unemployment pool is relatively stagnant with low outflow rates even in
comparison to other transition economies. Hence, from a conceptual point view, such job subsidies
may be a good way to increase the turnover of the unemployment pool. Public works are direct job
creation programmes which are not only targeted at very hard to employ people, but also at certain
regions with underdeveloped infrastructure. Typical jobs are in construction or cleaning. The
programmes of training, intervention works, and public works are the most important ones in
Poland and are analysed in this paper.
When estimating the re-employment effects of active labour market programmes in Poland one has
to take into account that programme participants are different from the ordinary non-participant
unemployment population. This means that simple comparisons of re-employment rates between
participants and non-participants after the programme should not be interpreted as causal effects of
the programme. To obtain a valid comparison that controls for the different personal characteristics
the various programmes are targeted at, econometric estimation methods are used.
We show that training programmes increase the re-employment chances of the unemployed.
Intervention and public works programmes, on the other hand, have a negative employment effect
in the medium run. Comparable results have been found in research on similar programmes for
Hungary and eastern Germany. We have three explanations for this finding that are not mutually
exclusive.
The first explanation is conceptual. As lack of qualification is most often key to unemployment,
training may work better because it addresses the very cause of the problem. The second
explanation is institutional. In our observation period (1992-1996) participation in intervention or
public works renewed the entitlement period to unemployment benefits to another full term of 12
months. As a consequence, a lot of people ‘cycled’ between the works programmes and
unemployment benefits. The fact that around 25 percent of works programmes participants are
from the (public) administration (as opposed to only 2 (!) percent of the unemployed) is consistent
with the existence of some comradeship amongst public administrators which results in a misuse
of works programmes as a means to prolong unemployment benefits. The third explanation refers
to stigma effects of works programmes. If employers have a bad opinion of works programmes,
they will see participation in such a programme as a negative signal on a person’s productivity.
Policy conclusions that may follow are to increase the expenditure share of training in active
labour market programmes and to separate unemployment benefit entitlement from participation in
an active programme. In addition, one may want to think about re-employment premia paid to the
unemployed (i.e. not to the employer) to avoid stigma effects.Abstract
We estimate the employment effects of training, intervention works (subsidised
employment), and public works programmes in Poland. The analysis is based on
retrospective monthly calendar information on the labour force state and active
labour market programme (ALMP) participation between January 1992 and August
1996. The data are obtained from the Polish Labour Force Survey of August 1996
and its Supplement on Labour Market Policies.
Because there is no general agreement on the appropriate evaluation methodology
when working with non-experimental data, we use two widely applied approaches
to identify causal effects. First, non-parametric estimates of the programme effects
are obtained on the basis of matched samples. Second, we use traditional
econometric modelling in the form of duration models with unobserved individual
heterogeneity.
We find that training improves the employment opportunities of both men and
women, whereas intervention and public works do not: intervention works prolong
unemployment for both genders as do public works for men. The number of
observations on women in public works is too small to make a statistically safe
statement.
In general, all ALMP effects are larger in absolute size for men than for women.
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1 Introduction
In Poland as in all other central European transition countries except the Czech
Republic, the transition process was accompanied by the appearance of open mass
unemployment. From 1990 to 1993, the registered unemployment rate rose from
virtually zero to 16.4 percent. Thereafter it declined, although it still stood at around
10.2 percent in the last quarter of 1997.
Active labour market programmes (ALMPs) have been implemented in Poland right
from the beginning of the transition process. Because it is ceteris paribus more
costly to treat an unemployed person with an active labour market programme like
training or a job subsidy than to just hand out unemployment benefits, it is
important to know whether these programmes are value for money. This study
contributes to this question by estimating the employment effects of training,
subsidised jobs (called intervention works in Poland) and direct job creation (public
works) programmes in Poland at the individual (microeconomic) level.
Previous microeconometric studies on Polish ALMPs by Puhani and Steiner (1996;
1997) and Puhani (1996) find no effect of training on employment, but negative
effects of works programmes (Puhani and Steiner). It has to be kept in mind,
though, that the quality of the data used for evaluation purposes has been a serious
problem in these studies, as the timing of unemployment and ALMP participation
could not be identified from the Polish Labour Force Survey Supplement of August
1994, which has been the only available data source with which microeconometric
ALMP evaluation could be attempted. We have therefore proposed to ascertain
retrospective monthly calendar information on employment, unemployment, and
ALMP programme participation in the August 1996 Supplement to the Polish
Labour Force Survey (Steiner, Puhani, and Kwiatkowski, 1995). Such data is now
available and, to our knowledge, we are able to present the first microeconometric
evaluation of the re-employment effects of ALMP programmes in Poland that use
this data.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of Poland’s
main ALMPs. Because there is no agreement on the best estimation method when
working with non-experimental data (Ashenfelder and Card, 1985; LaLonde, 1986),
we shortly present two widely used approaches to the identification of causal effects
in Section 3. Section 4 is the empirical part of the paper where we exhibit the main
estimation results. For more detail on these results, the reader is referred to Puhani
(1998). Section 5 concludes.2
2 Active Labour Market Policy in Poland
The main active labour market programmes (ALMPs) that currently exist in Poland
are training or retraining for the employed and unemployed, subsidies to
employment in terms of wage subsidies (called intervention works in Poland) or
loans to enterprises, public works, and start-up loans to support self-employment.
The Act on Employment and the Act on Group Layoffs which took effect at the
beginning of 1990 established the Labour Fund as the main financial source for the
funding of labour market policies. About one third of the Labour Fund’s resources
is drawn from employer’s contributions. These are equal to 3 percent of the product
wage. The other two thirds of the fund are drawn directly from the state budget. So
far, employees do not have to pay directly into the fund.
The development of Labour Fund expenditures is described in Table 1.
Table 1: The Development of Labour Fund Expenditures 1990-1996
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Share of PLMP exp. in GDP 0.34 1.38 1.71 1.72 1.72 1.93 1.75
Share of ALMP exp. in GDP 0.21 0.12 0.09 0.23 0.27 0.26 0.21
Policy activism 38.1 8.0 5.0 11.8 13.6 11.9 10.7
Share of training in ALMP exp. 1.3 9.5 18.0 12.7 12.7 9.19 13.5
Share of IW in ALMP exp. 17.6 47.8 43.7 38.5 40.7 44.8 40.1
Share of PW in ALMP exp. 0.0 0.0 16.2 33.7 36.8 36.5 34.6
Share of loans in ALMP exp. 81.0 42.7 22.1 15.1 9.7 9.6 13.5
Notes: policy activism is defined as the percentage share of  ALMP (active labour market policy)
expenditure in total Labour Fund expenditure; loans include both start-up loans and loans to enterprises.
PLMP: passive labour market policy (unemployment benefits); IW: intervention works; PW: public works;
exp.: expenditure.
Source: Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy.
It is shown that policy activism defined as the share of ALMP expenditures in total
Labour Fund expenditures was as high as 38 percent right at the beginning of the
transition period, but declined to 5 percent in 1992. After 1992, there was a rise in
the activity rate again to between 11 and 14 percent. Although policy activism as
just defined was never as high again as in 1990, the share of expenditures on
ALMPs in GDP surpassed the level of 1990 as soon as 1993. What happened was
that from 1990 to 1992, Polish unemployment skyrocketed from 0 to almost 14
percent so that PLMP expenditures crowded out ALMP expenditures and reduced
policy activism. Nevertheless, as can be seen from Table 1, policy makers renewed
their commitment to active labour market policies in the subsequent period.3
However, Table 1 also shows that the policy mix has changed dramatically between
various labour market policies. In 1990, loans (mainly start-up loans) were the main
tool of active labour market policy, but already in 1991, interventions works had
increased their expenditure share above the one of start-up loans. Loans were then
reduced to a tenth of total expenditures with the largest funds going to intervention
and public works. As we will evaluate training, intervention and public works in
this study as the main ALMPs in Poland, short descriptions of these programmes are
given in the following.
Training and Retraining
The main aim of the Polish training programmes is to increase the employment
chances of the unemployed. However, training courses may also be granted to
workers who are in danger of losing their jobs due to lack of skills. There are
training courses that take place in classrooms and are organised by the labour
offices themselves. Others are delivered by private agencies which are paid for by
the local labour offices. Or, as a third alternative, training can take place within
firms (O’Leary, 1997a). The training courses usually last from three to six months.
Prominent courses taught are using computers, accounting, secretarial work,
working as a salesperson, and some craft trades, such as tailoring or welding. Whilst
on a training course, an allowance is paid out to the participants which is equal to
115 percent of the amount of unemployment benefit. In order to make sure that the
training participants take the programme seriously, they have to repay the costs of
the course if it is not completed. There are not only incentives on the demand side
of training, but also on the supply side. Partnership firms get a reduction on income
tax since 1992 if they organise training courses in regions declared to be threatened
by structural unemployment. This reduction is equal to six or nine times the
minimum wage, depending on the length of the course (Kwiatkowski, Kubiak, and
Kucharski, 1997).
Intervention Works (Job Subsidies)
As training courses, intervention works programmes seek to facilitate the re-
integration of unemployed persons into the world of work. Intervention works
participants can in principle choose to work in any type of job. The local labour
office then pays out a subsidy to the employer. The employment subsidy can be paid
out for 6 to 12 months. For 6 months’ work contracts, the local labour office pays a
subsidy equal to the unemployment benefit. The social security contributions are
also covered by the labour office. If the employer decides to employ the
intervention works participant for 12 months, the labour office pays out an amount
equal to the minimum wage every second month, which is about 15 percent higher
than the unemployment benefit. In addition, the social security contributions are
covered by the labour office every second month. A further incentive to the4
employer is the possibility of receiving a grant of 150 percent of the average wage
in the economy if the employer continues to employ the programme participant after
the intervention works programme (Kwiatkowski, Kubiak, and Kucharski, 1997).
The concept of intervention works programmes is that they allow the employer to
gather information on the productivity of the unemployed worker very cheaply. This
productivity might be higher than initially perceived by the allegedly prejudiced
employer. In addition, the worker has the potential to acquire firm-specific human
capital during his or her intervention works period so that he or she can raise his or
her value to the employer. A rather different incentive to the unemployed worker to
join intervention works is the fact that, up to the 1
st of January 1997, the completion
of an intervention works course led to a complete renewal of the 12 months’
entitlement period to unemployment benefits.
Public Works
Public works are direct job creation programmes which are both targeted on the
long-term unemployed and on certain regions to develop local infrastructure. The
organisation of public works programmes is carried out by local labour offices in
co-operation with the municipalities in question. Typical public works jobs are in
construction or cleaning. As in the case of intervention works, the duration of the
programmes lies between 6 and 12 months. The incentives for the organisation
carrying out the public works programmes are similar to the ones for intervention
works. For 6 months’ contracts, the wage subsidy equals 75 percent of the average
wage in the economy. For 12 months’ contracts, a subsidy amounting to the average
wage is paid out every second month. In both cases, the labour office pays the social
security contribution monthly or every second month, respectively (Kwiatkowski,
Kubiak, and Kucharski, 1997). In regions that are declared to be threatened by
structural unemployment, the organiser of the public works programme may receive
further subsidies for non-labour inputs. This subsidy may not exceed 25 percent of
the total sum of wage subsidies, though. As in the case of intervention works, the
completion of a public works course led to a complete renewal of the 12 months'
entitlement period to unemployment benefits until the 1
st of January 1997.
In our empirical analysis, we evaluate Polish active labour market programmes for
the period 1992 to 1996. At that time, the new labour market institutions had
already been operating for at least two years and gathered some experience. It has to
be kept in mind, though, that during this period unemployment was very high in
Poland. On the one hand, such a situation is not a good precondition for trying to re-
integrate unemployed people into the labour market. On the other hand, times of
high unemployment are exactly those when ALMPs are most needed. Our
observation period is thus well suited to put active labour market programmes to the
test.5
3 Methodological Issues of Microeconometric ALMP
Evaluation
The fundamental problem of estimating causal effects of labour market programmes
is that the outcome variable for an individual is never observed in both states of the
world: treatment (participation in the ALMP programme) and non-treatment (non-
participation). To illustrate this point, let the outcome of a training programme one
tries to evaluate be the re-employment opportunity of an unemployed person. For an
unemployed person who has participated in a training programme, the causal effect
of that participation is the difference in his or her re-employment opportunity with
training to his or her re-employment opportunity without training. Of course, his or
her re-employment opportunity without training is counterfactual and therefore
unobservable. Similarly, for a person who has not participated in a training course,
the outcome had the person participated is counterfactual. For this reason, the causal
effect of a programme can never be observed. In this sense, the problem of
estimating the causal effects of labour market programmes is a missing data
problem (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
More formally, we can define the treatment effect τ  for person i as:
τ iii YY =− 10
where  i is an index running over the individuals in the population. Y i1 is the
hypothetical value of the outcome variable (say unemployed or not) when person i
gets treatment (e.g. a training course), and Yi0 is the hypothetical value of the
outcome variable when the same person does not receive treatment. Each person has
in theory both a Y i1 and a Yi0. However, for programme participants only Y i1 is
observable, and Yi0 is counterfactual. On the other hand, for non-participants only
Yi0 is observable, and Y i1 is counterfactual.
3.1  The Statistical Matching Approach to the Selection Problem in
Non-Experimental Studies
It is the purpose of the statistical matching method to obtain unbiased estimates of τ
when working with non-experimental data. Statistical matching means to explicitly
select (match) one or more control observations to each treatment observation such
that both persons are as similar as possible in terms of observed characteristics. Of
course, in the non-experimental context, treatment assignment  T = 1 bg  is not random.
However, treatment assignment may be random given a set of covariates z (Rubin,
1977). More formally, this reads6
Pr Pr TT ii i j i j === == ∀ = 11 zz zz z z c h ej
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that the dimensionality of the matching
problem can be reduced to one by matching not on z, but on
Pr T = 1z ch
i.e. the probability of receiving treatment conditional on the characteristics z. In
case the programme participation probability is equal for two individuals, these two
people can be regarded as taking part in a ‘sub-experiment’: if one of these two
people has participated in a programme and the other one not, there is no a priori
reason that the distributions of the outcome variables (Y 1, Y0) should differ between
the treatment and comparison persons. In other words, the probability to receive
treatment  balances the distributions of the outcomes (Y 1,  Y0) for treatment and
comparison persons. It is therefore called a balancing score (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983). The principle of matching is to find for each treatment person a comparison
person with equal balancing score. This way one simulates ‘sub-experiments’ for
each treatment person. The difference in the average outcome between the treatment
and matched comparison samples is therefore an unbiased estimate of the treatment
effect.
The matching approach is in essence a model-free method of evaluation that stands
in the statistical tradition. The traditional approach of econometricians is to first
build an economic model of the outcome variable of interest and then specify on the
basis of this model a relationship that can be estimated empirically. This procedure
will be described in the following section.
3.2  Evaluation of ALMPs by Duration Models
As just outlined, the identification problem for causal effects arises from the fact
that programme participants and non-participants may differ in other aspects
besides treatment. The matching approach presented in Section 3.1 attempts to solve
this problem by selecting for each member of the treatment group one person of the
non-treatment group who is as similar as possible to the treatment group member in
terms of observed characteristics. Likewise, regression-type  methods control for
differences in observed characteristics by including them as regressors in an
econometric model of the outcome variable (e.g. employment). In addition to
estimating the causal effect of a programme, the traditional econometric approach
builds a whole model of the outcome variable. Programme participation is then only
one of many determinants of the outcome, and may be implemented by way of a
dummy variable, which takes on the value one if participation has occurred and zero
if not.7
The problem with this approach is that ALMP participation may be an endogenous
variable so that coefficient estimates of the programme participation variable will be
biased. However, Heckman and Hotz (1989) demonstrate that if all variables that
drive programme participation are observed (selection on observables), the
endogeneity problem can be addressed by including all these variables in the
outcome equation.
However, there might also be selection on unobservables. This is equivalent to
saying that some of the variables in the participation (selection) equation are
unobservable, i.e. there is some unobserved individual heterogeneity in the selection
equation. As the existence of any remaining unobserved individual heterogeneity
can be tested, one can use a test on unobserved individual heterogeneity as a test for
selection on unobservables. If no unobserved individual heterogeneity is found,
then one can reject selection on unobservables. In the presence of unobserved
individual heterogeneity, selection on unobservables cannot be rejected, which
means that programme effect estimates may be biased, although they need not
necessarily be biased. Details on the test for unobserved individual heterogeneity
which will be applied in this study are described in Section 4.3.2, below.
4 Microeconometric ALMP Evaluation: Empirical Analysis
for Poland
In this section, we estimate the effects of training, intervention, and public works
programmes on the re-employment chances of the unemployed. As unemployment
is  the  indicator of being disadvantaged in the Polish labour market, we will
exclusively focus on re-employment effects and not consider any possible effects on
wages. Section 4.1 describes the data source as well as our methodology to create
unemployment spells from it. The empirical evaluations of Polish ALMPs are then
presented in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. The two estimation methods used will be mean
comparisons on the basis of matched samples on the one hand (cf. Lechner, 1995;
1996a; 1996b; O’Leary, 1997b; and Fitzenberger and Prey, 1998), and duration
model analysis on the other (cf. Pannenberg, 1995; 1996; Puhani, 1996; Kraus,
Puhani, and Steiner, 1997; 1998; and Staat, 1997).
4.1  Data
The best currently available data source which allows an evaluation of ALMPs on
the individual level in Poland is the Polish Labour Force Survey (PLFS) together
with its Supplement on Active Labour Market Policies of August 1996. There has
already been a supplementary survey on ALMPs in August 1994, yet the8
information on the timing and duration of ALMPs is very sparse there and not
compatible with the August 1996 survey (cf. Puhani and Steiner, 1996; 1997;
Puhani, 1996; Kwiatkowski, Kubiak, and Kucharski, 1997). Therefore, we only use
data from the August 1996 survey. The main part of the PLFS has information on
socio-economic variables like age, gender, education, occupation, and industry at
the time of interview or the last time of employment. Unlike the 1994 survey, the
August 1996 supplement gives retrospective monthly calendar information on a
person’s labour force state from January 1992 to August 1996. This information is
asked for in the following way:
Figure 1: Retrospective Information on the Labour Force State in the Polish
Labour Force Survey Supplement of August 1996
In which months of the year 1992
(1993/4/5/6) were you
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
Working for money xx x
Registered as unemployed xxxx xx
Participating in your last public training xxx
Participating in intervention works
Participating in public works
Note: In this example, the person has been employed (working for money), unemployed, and in a training
programme in 1992. The person has obviously not participated in any intervention or public works
programmes in 1992.
Source: Polish Labour Force Survey August 1996 Supplement Questionnaire; available from the Central
Statistical Office (GUS) of Poland.
It is thus possible to observe the labour market history of each individual between
January 1992 and August 1996. Employment, registered unemployment, and ALMP
participation spells can hence be retrieved. However, whereas all intervention and
public works spells between 1992 and 1996 can be identified from the survey, only
the last publicly-financed training course is asked for. Therefore, we do not know
whether somebody has been in public training more than once.
In case a person ticks more than one labour force state, we classify the person to be
in the state mentioned in a lower line of Figure 1. To give an example, if somebody
reports to be employed and to be in an intervention works programme, we classify
that person to be in an intervention works programme. This makes sense, as an
employee in an intervention works programme cannot be treated as regularly
employed for our purposes. A problem arises when somebody states that he or she is
both employed and unemployed. In this case, we classify that person to be
unemployed on the assumption that he or she is working for less than half the
minimum wage, which is officially allowed in Poland whilst being registered as9
unemployed and receiving benefits (Kwiatkowski, 1995; Góra and Schmidt, 1997).
Unfortunately, we do not have any further information on the type of employment to
check whether that person broke the rules and was in fact regularly employed. It is
also quite likely that many persons who report both employment and unemployment
as labour force states for a month have in fact been in both of these states during
that month. By classifying those people as unemployed we also identify short
unemployment spells which last less than a month. As it occurs in less than one
percent of the cases that a person reports to be both employed and unemployed,
these people do not seem to embody a major problem for the empirical analysis.
The focus of this evaluation is on people who join an active labour market
programme out of the state of unemployment, because the main purpose of ALMPs
is to reduce the re-employability of the unemployed. Therefore, persons who receive
treatment (participate in a programme) without a preceding unemployment spell are
not included in the sample. As a consequence, all persons that have never been
registered as unemployed cannot act as valid comparison persons and are therefore
also excluded from the sample. When creating unemployment spells, the state of
being in an ALMP programme is also treated as unemployment. To take the
example of Figure 1, if a person becomes unemployed in February 1992, gets into a
publicly-financed training scheme in June 1992, then becomes unemployed again
after the scheme in September 1992 only to find a job in November 1992, we treat
the whole period from February 1992 up to October 1992 as one unemployment
spell. Figure 2 gives a graphical presentation.
Figure  2:  The Definition of the Unemployment Spell Corresponding to
Figure 1
Calendar time
The only labour force states which terminate an unemployment spell are
employment and non-participation in the labour market. A person is classified as
not participating in the labour market if he or she is not in any of the labour force
states mentioned in Figure 1.
Employment
One Unemployment Spell with Training Course
Feb 1992 Nov 1992
Training Period
Employment
Jun 1992 Sep 199210
Table 2 has the number of the ALMP participants and comparison spells in our
sample. As some persons experience more than one spell during the observation
period, we report the number of persons and the number of spells separately. Left-
censored observations do not allow modelling of process time (Blossfeld and
Rohwer, 1995; Chapter 2). As the statistical treatment of left-censored observations
is generally not straightforward (Hamerle, 1991), we follow the standard approach
in the empirical literature and do not include these observations in the sample. The
loss of observations through excluding left-censored spells lies between 20 and 30
percent. Right-censored observations will be included in the statistical analyses of
the following two sections. However, because one does not know the time when the
spell ends nor the state into which exit occurs, the information content of right-
censored spells is much smaller than the one of completed spells.
The share of right-censored spells varies between 19 percent for men in training and
71 for women in public works. The small number of observations for women in
public works makes a serious statistical analysis impossible. Nevertheless, we will
also carry out an evaluation for this group in the hope that at least some tentative
evidence can be obtained. Unfortunately, the number of completed spells for men in
public works is also very small.
However, a very important and positive characteristic of the sample, especially for
the matching approach, is the large number of comparison spells. The larger the
pool of comparison spells, the more likely it is to find good matches for the
treatment spells. Depending on the programme, we have 26 to 78 times as many
comparison as treatment persons (not considering women in public works with 286
times as many comparison as treatment persons). The corresponding figures are
lower in other studies which use the matching approach where treatment and
comparison persons are drawn from the same data source. Lechner (1995; 1996a)
has around 10 times more comparison than treatment persons. In Lechner (1996b),
O’Leary (1997b), and Hujer, Maurer, and Wellner (1997) these ratios are around 4,
1.3, and 3.2, respectively. Our sample thus provides very good a priori conditions
for applying the matching approach, which will be presented in the following
section.11
Table 2: Selection of the ALMP Participants Samples
Selection criterion Men Women Total
Training
Former or Current Participants 97 151 248
Age between 16 and 65 97 150 247
Persons / spells where
unemployment precedes ALMP
67 / 67 115 / 115 182 / 182
Persons / spells not left censored 52 / 52 88 / 88 140 / 140
Not right-censored 42 / 42 52 / 52 94 / 94
Intervention Works
Former or Current Participants 313 269 582
Age between 16 and 65 313 268 581
Persons / spells where
unemployment precedes ALMP
267 / 269 217 / 219 484 / 488
Persons / spells not left censored 193 / 193 154 / 155 347 / 348
Not right-censored 74 / 74 68 / 68 142 / 142
Public Works
Former or Current Participants 82 26 108
Age between 16 and 65 82 26 108
Persons / spells where
unemployment precedes ALMP
70 / 72 20 / 20 90 / 92
Persons / spells not left censored 49 / 50 14 / 14 (!) 63 / 64
Not right-censored 18 / 18 (!) 4 / 4 (!) 22 / 22
Non-participants (comparisons)
Unemployed persons / spells aged
between 16 and 65
3684 / 4727 4169 / 5068 7853 / 9795
Unemployed persons / spells not
left censored
3160 / 3922 3422 / 4010 6582 / 7932
Not right-censored 2165 / 2612 2041/ 2301 4206 / 4913
Note: The bold lines refer to the sample for the empirical analyses below; non-participants have not
participated in any ALMP programme.
Source: Polish Labour Force Survey; own calculations.12
4.2  Evaluation of ALMPs by Way of the Statistical Matching
Approach
4.2.1  Implementation Strategy
To build an estimator of the treatment effect on the treated τ T= 1  by matching on the
programme participation probability Pr T = 1z di , the first step is to estimate this
probability, which is unknown. To this end, a probit equation for participation in
each programme will be estimated by maximum likelihood (similarly, Lechner,
1995; 1996a; 1996b; and Almus et al. estimate probit, Dehejia and Wahba, 1995a;
1995b; and Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997 estimate logit models).
Having obtained an estimate of the programme participation probability Pr T = 1z c h ,
one can match to each treatment person a comparison person with the same
estimated participation probability Φ ’ γ z bg , which acts as the balancing score.
Often, it is not possible to find a comparison person with exactly the same estimated
balancing score Φ ’ γ z bg . In this case, one can define the nearest neighbour to the
treatment person as that comparison person who has the closest estimated balancing
score Φ ’ γ z bg . A related method which we will use here has been applied by Lechner
(1995; 1996a; 1996b) who uses ’ γ z as the balancing score.
However, we will only use the estimate ’ γ z from the probit model as a partial
balancing score. The reason is that in order to improve the comparability of
treatment and matched comparison persons, we want to match exactly on a set of
variables, which means we want some variables to take on identical values for
treatment and comparison persons. These variables are the labour force state before
the beginning of the unemployment spell and, most importantly, the time in
unemployment until somebody gets into an ALMP programme, which is defined as
mT = calendar time when ALMP started – calendar time when unemployment started
In the example of Figure 1 on page 8, mT is equal to 4 months. In our sample, mT
ranges between 1 to 52 months, whereas the median durations mT are around 6
months for training and 12 months for intervention and public works programmes.
We choose to condition on mT exactly, because it is only defined for treatment
persons and can therefore not be included in the cross-sectional probit estimation
for programme participation. However, when matching a comparison to a treatment
person, we require the comparison person to have been unemployed more than mT
months. This way we ensure that the comparison person is also comparable to the13
treatment person in terms of process time in unemployment until the treatment
person joined the ALMP programme. If this requirement is fulfilled, we match on
the estimated partial balancing score  ’ γ z. The total balancing score is
’ ,,,, , γ z mEEE T 13 6 ch . The variables E1 to E6 and the matching algorithm in detail are
described in the following.
The Matching Algorithm
Step 1: For (formerly) unemployed people, a probit model for ALMP participation
is estimated. The estimated index  ’ γ z from this probit model is in the
following used as the partial balancing score.
Step 2: The observations are split into two pools, a treatment (ALMP participant;
T = 1) and a comparison (non-participant; T = 0) pool.
Step 3: The person from the treatment pool with the lowest partial balancing score
is taken and removed from the treatment pool. The number of months mT this
treatment person has been unemployed until he or she started the ALMP
programme is noted. Furthermore, it is noted whether 1, 3, and 6 months
before the start of the unemployment spell in which the ALMP programme
took place, the treatment person has been in employment or not
( E1 10 = / ,E3 10 = / ,E6 10 = / ).
Step 4: All persons are removed from the comparison pool who have not been
unemployed for more than mT months and have not been in the same labour
force states ( E1,  E2, and  E6) as the treatment person 1, 3 and 6 months
before the start of their unemployment spell.
Step 5: If after Step 4 no-one is left in the comparison pool, Step 4 is undone and
then repeated again but without the condition that the labour force status 6
months before unemployment (E6) is equal to the one of the treatment person.
If still no one is left in the comparison pool after the application of this
modified Step 4, the condition that the labour force states 3 and 1 months
before unemployment (E3 and  E1) equal those of the treatment person are
also dropped one by one. The condition on the number of months in
unemployment before treatment mT is never dropped as this is not necessary
with our specific sample.
Step 6: For the treatment person, those persons from the comparison pool selected
under Steps 4 and 5 are found who have the partial balancing score with the
smallest difference  ’ ’ γγ zz TT == − 10
2 b g to the partial balancing score of the
treatment person. If the number of comparison persons selected this way14
exceeds one, one person is randomly drawn from the selected comparison
persons. This person is then taken as the matched comparison person and
removed from the comparison pool.
Step 7: The removals from the comparison pool undertaken under Steps 4 and 5 are
undone.
Step 8: Steps 3 to 7 are repeated until the treatment pool is empty. Then all
treatment observations have exactly one partner from the comparison pool
matched to them.
The quality of the programme effect estimate rests both on the quality of the
programme participation estimate and the ability to find comparison persons with
equal participation probabilities as the treatment persons. In order to ensure that the
best possible estimate of the programme participation probability Pr T = 1z c h  is
obtained, the probit model should include all observed variables z that one may
think to influence programme participation. Indeed, probit estimates are
inconsistent if any relevant variables are omitted from estimation, even if the
omitted variables are uncorrelated with the error term (Greene, 1997; Chapter 19).
The estimates of the balancing scores can be found in Puhani (1998). Sample means
of treatments, naive and matched comparison groups are given in Table 5, Table 6
and Table 7 in the appendix to this paper. Here we concentrate on the presentation
of the evaluation results.
4.2.2  Non-Parametric Programme Evaluation Based on Matched Samples
Whereas it is straightforward to define pre- and post-treatment periods for treatment
persons, it is a priori unclear how one should set the time scale for the comparisons.
Indeed, there is by definition no point in time for the comparison persons when they
join an ALMP programme. However, we have matched on the precondition that the
comparison person has to have been unemployed more than mT months, where mT is
the number of months it took the unemployed treatment person to get into the
ALMP programme. We can thus define time zero for the comparison person at his
or her  mT
th
+ 1 bg  month in unemployment. This definition is very useful, as it
guarantees that at time zero, the treatment and matched comparison persons have a
similar recent unemployment history. The treatment effect starts to work for the
treated when they join the ALMP programme. It is an obvious choice to compare
the comparison person with the treatment person from process time  mT + 1 bg  onwards
and interpret the difference in unemployment rates after process time  mT + 1 bg
(defined as time zero in Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5 below) as the causal effect
of the ALMP programme. Lechner (1995; 1996a; 1996b) and Fitzenberger and Prey
(1998) use a similar approach in their papers.15
Pre-Treatment Tests
To check whether treatment and comparison groups are really comparable, we
compare  pre-treatment outcomes between treatment and matched comparison
persons (Heckman and Hotz, 1989). For a comparison of the sample means of main
characteristics, see Puhani (1988). Estimated pre- and post-treatment differences in
unemployment rates between treatment and matched comparison groups are plotted
in Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5. More formally, the estimated difference between
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where Yit is either zero (employed) or one (unemployed) for person i at time t . If
somebody is not in the labour force at time t  he or she makes no contribution to the
unemployment rate at that time. In order to test whether there are any pre-treatment
differences in the unemployment rates of treatments and comparisons, we calculate
standard errors for ∆  URt
 
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(given random assignment conditional on the covariate z,  YtT= 1,z and YtT= 0,z are
independent random variables). Using the central limit theorem, we approximate the
distribution of ∆  URt by the normal distribution and build a 90 percent confidence
interval for ∆  URt which is given by
∆∆  .   UR UR tt ±× 1645 σ di
As Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5 below show, the pre-treatment unemployment
rates are in no case significantly different from each other (the results for women in
public works are only displayed for comparative purposes in Figure  5). We
therefore conclude from this evidence together with the results from comparisons of
the means in key characteristics (see Puhani, 1998, for details) that the matching
method has worked well in producing an adequate comparison group for the
treatment group. Therefore, we interpret the post-treatment differences in
unemployment rates of treatment and matched comparison persons as the causal
effect of treatment on unemployment. More formally,
 
, , τ tt T tt UR >= > = 01 0 ∆
is interpreted as the treatment effect on the treated (ALMP participants) t months
after the beginning of the ALMP programme.16
This approach also accounts for time-invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity
if one gives it a difference-in-differences interpretation. The difference-in-
differences interpretation generally requires the assumption that
E Y TE Y T E Y TE Y T it i it i it i it i 0 0 01 01 10 1 0 =− == =− = −− ch ch c hc h ,
where  Y i1 and Yi0 are defined as in Section 3 above. In the matching context, the
required assumption is less strong, namely
EY T EY T EY T EY T it i it i it i it i 0 0 01 01 10 1 0 =− == =− = −− ,, , , zz z z ch ch c hc h
(Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997). The Heckman and Hotz (1989) pre-
treatment test checks whether the right-hand side of this assumption is zero, i.e.
EY T EY T it i it i 01 01 10 0 −− =− == ,, zz ch ch .
If this is the case, the difference-in-differences estimator is equal to
 
, , τ tt T tt UR >= > = 01 0 ∆ , which means that simple post-treatment unemployment differences
between treatments and comparisons can be interpreted as causal programme
effects.
Evaluation Results
The point estimates from Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5 below give a rather clear
picture on the effects of the ALMP programmes investigated. Whereas the figures
show that training programmes improve the re-employment chances of the trainees,
intervention and public works programmes seem to have negative effects on
employment opportunities. However, not all of these effects are statistically
significant. Because the number of observations (and hence the quality of the
approximation through the normal distribution) shrinks the further we move away
from time zero, we will in the following only interpret the results up to the 20
th
month after the beginning of the ALMP programme.
Figure 3 shows that the positive effect of training for men is statistically significant
at the 10 percent level for most of the post-treatment time period. This is not so for
women, where the positive effect of training is only significant for one month. The
point estimates, however, suggest that training reduces the unemployment rate of
the female programme participants by about 10 percentage points. For men, the
estimate is more erratic over time, but a 10-15 percentage point reduction in
unemployment seems to be a conservative average number.
For intervention and public works, the estimated effects are generally significant at
the 10 percent level (women in public works are the exception). Men after17
intervention or public works have unemployment rates about 30 percentage points
higher than the comparison group. For women, the unemployment rate after
intervention works is about 10 percentage points higher in the first 20 months after
the start of the programme. The results for women after public works, which are
only presented for comparative purposes and cannot be seriously interpreted,
suggest a similar effect as for women in intervention works.18
Figure  3:  Difference in Unemployment Rates between Trainees and the















































































Notes: negative (positive) months correspond to the pre- (post-)treatment period;
number of observations N (at month t) for men (T: treatment / C: comparison): N(-30) T/C = 33 / 29; N(-
15) T/C = 41 / 39; N(0) T/C = 52 / 52; N(15) T/C = 27 / 28; N(30) T/C = 9 / 13;
number of observations for women: N(-30) T/C = 22 / 26; N(-15) T/C = 48 / 47; N(0) T/C = 88 / 88; N(15)
T/C = 47 / 42; N(30) T/C = 19 / 19.
Source: Polish Labour Force Survey; own calculations.19
Figure  4:  Difference in Unemployment Rates between Intervention Works
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